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Available online 3 October 2018AbstractThis paper investigates competition and risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks taking a sample of 59 Islamic banks and 149 conventional
banks from 10 highly developed Islamic banking countries between 2006 and 2016. The level of competitiveness between the two types of banks
is determined using Lerner index and estimations show that Islamic banks have lower market power than conventional banks. After controlling
all the bank and country-specific variables, the results show that competition and risk are positively related for the overall banking system and
inversely related for Islamic banks which undoubtedly emphasize that inherent difference between risk-competition relationships among these
two distinct bank types. Overall, in the case of Islamic banks, the results provide evidence in favour of “competition stability view” where higher
competitive market associated with fierce competition from conventional banks and its peers' reduce Islamic banks' risk-taking behaviour.
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One of the interesting issues to look at in the banking
literature is the contrast of risk-taking behaviour of different
banks and the factors that cause the banks to adopt different
structures of risk. According to Saurina, Jimenez, and Lopez
(2007), “excessive competition among banks could threaten
the solvency of particular institutions and, at an aggregate
level, hamper the stability of the entire banking system”,
meaning bank failures always come together with an increased
competition in the banking market. Hence, the effect of
competition in banking-sector is one of the key determinants
that impact on bank risk-taking. Nevertheless, existence theory
and empirical evidence on this subject produced mixed and
contradictory results.* Corresponding author.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).The traditional view from the previous economic and
finance literature hold that there is a positive relationship be-
tween the risks that banks take and the competition that the
banks face (Hellmann, Murdock, & Stiglitz, 2000; Repullo,
2004; Forssback & Shehzad 2011). It means that the incen-
tive of banks to take on more risk is increased as competition
increases. This relationship is based on this “competition-
fragility view”, which is also called “charter value hypothesis”
or “franchise value paradigm” (Allen & Gale, 2004). Charter
or franchise value can be stated as the value of a bank being
able to continue its business in the future (Saurina et al., 2007).
Thus, the competition-fragility view assumes that banks in
excessive competition banking systems are less concentrated
and have less market power which will erode the charter
values of the banks. Banks have less market power to extract
the monopoly benefits from the charter values which will
eventually lead them to take on more risks with riskier policies
such as lowering the level of capital or acquire more credit risk
in the loan portfolio, in order to maintain its former profitsting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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assumes that bank competition occurs only in deposit market
and contracting problems like moral hazard effects in which
private information and borrowers' actions depend on the in-
terest rates charged by banks do not occur under this view
(Boyd, De Nicolo & Al Jalal 2006).
Contrary to this view, a recent literature based on work by
Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Boyd, De Nicolo & Al Jalal 2009
(the BDN model) which is also known as “competition-sta-
bility view” suggested that the risk-taking behaviour of banks
and competition within the sector have a negative correlation.
This correlation is based on the existence of the contracting
problem; that the moral hazard problem occurs within the
BDN model. The model is founded on the study and com-
parison of both deposit and loan market competition concur-
rently which is different from the traditional view which only
analyzes the deposit market competition. The model suggests
that reduced competition in banking-sector can lead to higher
interest rates being passed onto the business loans.
According to this competition-stability view, the offset be-
tween stability in the banking sector and the competition implied
by the deposit market competition based on “competition-
fragility view” could be eliminated by the loan market compe-
tition since the recent view incorporates both approaches. This
recent view basically provides the only incentives to the banks to
maintain the traditional asset side policies from the economic
rents earned from the depositors. A “risk-shifting paradigm”
proposed by this recent model indicates more competition in
loan and deposit markets could promote the stability of the
banking market by lowering the borrowers' default risk over the
long run. A positive correlation between banks' overall default
risk and banking concentration shown in empirical evidence
hints that more competition in banking sector should be corre-
lated with lesser bank risk-taking behaviour and thus create a
greater bank stability provided by (Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005;
Boyd, De Nicolo & Al Jalal 2006; Boyd, De Nicolo & Al Jalal
2009 and Nicolo et al., 2004).
The emergence of Islamic banking system as an alternative
banking system has added another dimension to the compe-
tition theory within the dual banking system. The nature and
scope of Islamic banks are different from the traditional
banking system as Islamic banks are motivated towards a
justified distribution of wealth and income which might war-
rant for additional risk-taking behaviour. In the dual banking
system, Islamic banks do not only face competitions from their
peers but also from their conventional counterparts. It is
evident that Islamic banks are different from their conven-
tional counterparts in terms of sources and uses of funds which
will have an implication in their risk-taking behaviour. Islamic
banks are also small in size and have fewer opportunities for
diversification (due to religious nature of operation) adding
more pressure to riskiness in the system. Even though some
Islamic bank products are complex in nature, some business
mechanisms and governance structures allow Islamic banks to
undertake higher-risk transactions, achieve better perfor-
mance, and maintain superior capitalization than conventional
banks (Mollah, Hassan, Al Farooque, & Mobarek, 2016).The studies regarding the effects of competition on the
bank risk-taking behaviour has always been focused on the
conventional banks and lacks evidence for Islamic banks
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2006; Berger, Klapper, &
Turk-Ariss, 2009; Demsetz, Saidenberg, & Strahan, 1996;
Keeley, 1990; Marcus, 1984; Saurina et al., 2007). There are
ample evidence in the conventional banking system which
shows that systematic crisis is more evident in the countries
where banks are concentrated and have less competition
(Beck, Demeirguc-Kunt, Levine, 2006; Schaeck, M. Cihak, S;
Wolfe, 2009). On the other hand, studies also observed the
existence of the trade-off between competition and stability
(Jimenez et al., 2013; Fungacova, Solanko, Weill, 2014; Leroy
& Lucotte, 2017).
Even though there are some of the empirical studies
comparing the market power between Islamic banks and their
conventional competitors, those studies did not put much
focus on how competition may impact risk-taking among
Islamic banks. Despite the reality that Islamic banks grow
rapidly in today's economy, there is little systematic and
regular analysis and studies on the topic of the impact
competition have on bank-risk taking among Islamic banks.
Majority of the previous studies only focused on the com-
parison of banking performance, such as the comparison of
cost-profit efficiency and financial stability in dual-banking
systems, for example, studies provided by (El-Gamal &
Inanoglu, 2005; Cihak & Hesse, 2008 and Alam, 2012).
Although studies conducted by Weill (2011) or Sahut, Mili,
and Krir (2011) focused on the comparison of market
power between Islamic and conventional banks; but these
studies did not cover any association between competition
and risk-taking behaviour among Islamic banks. Only in the
last couple of years, there has been a growing interest in the
topic specially in the context of the dual banking system.
Gonzalez, Razia, Milagros, & Sestayo, 2017 using a sample
of MENA banks found that the increase in the competitive
environment leads to a decline in the financial stability of the
banking system. Authors further highlighted that the non-
Gulf banking system had lower competition and thus
higher efficiency which is in contrast to the Gulf banking
system. While Noman, Gee, & Isa, 2017 found a strong
support for competitionestability theory in ASEAN banking
system. The study further emphasized that larger banks are
more efficient leading to the more stable financial system.
However, Kabir and Worthington (2017) found contrasting
results. In their studies involving the dual banking system,
they found that market power has a positive impact on the
stability of both conventional and Islamic banks thus sup-
porting the competition-fragility hypothesis. A more detailed
literature on the stability issue within Islamic banking can be
also found in Hassan and Aliu, 2018.
Hence, it is not surprising that the effects that competition
has on bank-risk taking behaviour in Islamic banking concepts
are in a grey zone with unexplored questions. This topic still
remains ambiguous in theory and empirically under in-
vestigations even though there are relatively large amounts of
literature in conventional banks. Additionally, the conflicting
S36 N. Alam et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 19-S1 (2019) S34eS43results in the Islamic banking literature make difficult to know
whether modification of competition policy and effective
competition between financial intermediaries in the dual
banking system could constitute an alternative means of
improving financial stability.
2. Methodology
There are several well-established tools in measuring the
bank competitiveness in the banking literature, for instance,
Panzar-Rosse (1987) H-statistics which often known as PR-H
statistic, the Lerner index by Lerner (1934), the concentration
ratio (CR) as well as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI
index). For this study, we will use the Lerner index to reveal
the level of market power when assessing monopoly pricing
power. Lerner index has an advantage against Panzar-Rosse H-
statistic or HHI where the index is not a long-run equilibrium
measure of competition and can be computed at each point of
time (Berger et al., 2009; Sahut et al., 2011). Several recent
studies have used Lerner index in measuring the bank
competition, for instance, studies by (Berger et al., 2009;
Forssback & Shehzad 2011; Ireta, 2012; Sahut et al., 2011;
Saurina et al., 2007; Weill, 2011). It is defined as the differ-
ence between price and marginal cost, divided by price. To
calculate the Lerner index, a translog cost function will be first
estimated by constrained linear regression, imposing symme-
try and linear homogeneity restrictions (Forssback & Shehzad
2011). The cost function is shown as follows:
ln TCit ¼ a0 þ a1 ln Y þ 1
2
a2

lnY2
þ X3
j¼1
bj ln wjit þ
X3
j¼1

X3
k¼1
bjk ln wjit lnwkit þ
X3
j¼1
gj ln Y lnwjþ εit
ð1Þ
where TC denotes total costs, Y denotes one output (total as-
sets), wjk (w1, w2 and w3) indicate three input prices (i.e. price
of labour, price of physical capital and price of borrowed
funds).
The estimated coefficients derived from the cost function
are then used to calculate the marginal cost (MC). The de-
rivative of the logarithm of total cost with respect to the log-
arithm of output is calculated using the cost function in
Equation (1). Thus, the estimation of marginal cost is based on
the cost function presentation. The translog cost function is
estimated with one output (total assets) and three input prices
(price of labour, price of physical capital and price of bor-
rowed funds) as already mentioned above. Marginal cost is
then given by:
MCit ¼ TCit
yit
"
a1þ a2 ln yit þ
X3
j¼1
gj ln wjit
#
ð2Þ
Finally, once the marginal cost is estimated and price of
output is calculated, Lerner index for each bank and year canbe calculated in order to obtain a direct measure of bank
competition (Berger et al., 2009; Forssback & Shehzad 2011;
Ireta, 2012; Sahut et al., 2011; Weill, 2011). The Lerner index
indicates the proportion by which price above marginal cost,
and is calculated as:
Lerner index it ¼ PTAit  MCTAit
PTAit
ð3Þ
where PTAit is the price of banking outputs for bank i at time t,
MCit is the marginal costs for bank i at time t.
The resulting Lerner index it is averaged over time under
the study for each bank i. It takes values between 0 and 1.
When price equal to marginal cost; the Lerner index tends
towards zero and the banks are said in a purely competitive
market and no pricing power. When the index is high and
tends towards one, reflecting there is a high mark-up of price
above marginal cost; hence, the banks have a monopoly power
and the market power is increased. Generally, Lerner
index ¼ 0 indicates perfect competition in a market; whereas
Lerner index ¼ 1 indicates monopoly in a market. As stated by
Forssback & Shehzad (2011), Lerner index is an “opposite
measure of competition where a high Lerner index implies
lower competition”.
3. Data and sample
Once the competition index of each bank in each year is
computed, the next step is examining the effects competi-
tiveness have on banks' risk-taking behaviour. Given the
consideration of both theoretical and empirical literature
mentioned above, this paper uses the framework to evaluate
the correlation between competition and risk by basing on the
works proposed by (Alam, 2014; Berger et al., 2009;
Forssback & Shehzad 2011; Saurina et al., 2007).
The sample used in this study consists of banks in 10
countries which is mainly located in Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) and South East Asia (SEA): Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, KSA, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey
and UAE. The number of observation for Islamic banks is 472
and for conventional banks is 1192. The total bank-year ob-
servations stand at 1664. These countries are chosen as the
sample in this study because due to the fact that these 10
countries especially Indonesia, KSA, Malaysia, Qatar, Turkey,
UAE (refer as QISMUT) together with Bahrain hold two-
thirds of Islamic banking assets in the world, (EY report,
2016). Banking data has been taken from the Bankscope
database over the period 2006e2016. Additionally, a number
of bank-specific and country-specific macroeconomic vari-
ables as well as regulatory variables are used to examine the
risk-competition relationship.
The risk proxy used as the dependent variable in the main
regression in Equation (4) is a loan-loss reserve (LLR). Loan
loss reserve as a fraction of gross loan has been used as the
proxy of asset risk, such as studies by (Alam, 2012; Dick,
2006; Forssback & Shehzad 2011; Shaffer, 1998). Higher
loan-loss reserve indicates that banks have a greater risk in the
Table 1
The distribution of Islamic and conventional banks by country.
Country All Banks Conventional banks Islamic banks
Bahrain 19 8 11
Bangladesh 28 25 3
Indonesia 37 34 3
KSA 12 9 3
Kuwait 9 6 3
Malaysia 28 13 15
Pakistan 21 16 5
Qatar 9 6 3
Turkey 24 20 4
UAE 21 12 9
All 208 149 59
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non-performing loans (NPL) as a measure of bank risk. NPL,
the ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loan is a measure of
loan portfolio quality and contain information on bank risk not
captured by traditional measures of risk (Berger & DeYoung,
1997).
MPit is the market power of the bank calculated using the
Lerner index. B is a vector of bank-specific factors which
includes size of the bank measured as the natural log of total
assets (TA), the ratio of equity over total assets (the capitali-
zation ratio) (ETA), the return on average assets (ROAA), the
ratio of net loans to total assets (NLTA), the ratio of cost to
income (CI).
M is a vector of macro factors and is included in the main
regression to take account of the broad banking system dif-
ferences across the countries in the sample. The average
annual growth rate of gross domestic product per capita
(DGDP) is a variable that is used to control for each country's
economic performance. Another country-specific variable is
the average annual growth rate of consumer price index (CPI).
Similar to GDP per capita, consumer price index is often the
most frequently used statistics for identifying a country's
inflation or deflation. The demands for the financial products
depend on the level of economic activity in each country and
thus, it is also important to control for consumer price index
variable when analysing the risk-competition relationship.
The REG factor represents the level of banking regulation
in the respective country. Regulatory variables such as su-
pervisory power (SPOWER), capital requirements (CAPRQ),
private monitoring (PRMONIT) and restrictions on bank ac-
tivities (ACTR) taken from World Bank database as referred in
(Alam, 2014; Barth, Caprio & Levine 2001, 2013; Dick, 2006;
Jayaratne & Strahan, 1998; Repullo, 2004), are included in the
main regression due to the reasons that these variables may
impact on bank risk-taking behaviour.
SPOWER is a measure of the power of the supervisory
agencies. It is calculated on the basis of the answers to 14
questions indicating the extent to which supervisors can
change the internal organizational structure of the bank and/or
take specific disciplinary action against bank management and
directors, shareholders, and bank auditors. Higher values of
this variable indicate greater power of supervisory authorities
to get involved in banking decisions. CAPRQ is an index of
capital requirements, accounting for both initial and overall
capital stringency. The former indicates whether the sources of
funds counted as regulatory capital can include assets other
than cash or government securities and borrowed funds. The
latter indicates whether risk elements and value losses are
considered while calculating the regulatory capital. CAPRQ
can take values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating
more stringent capital requirements.
PRMONIT is an indicator of private monitoring that takes
values between 0 and 12 with higher values indicating higher
disclosure requirements and more incentives to increase pri-
vate monitoring. Barth et al., 2013 provides evidence that
regulations that enhance and facilitates private monitoring can
significantly boost bank efficiency and reduce risk-taking.ACTRS indicates the level of restrictions on the banks' ac-
tivities. It can take values between 0 and 4 with higher values
indicating higher restrictions. It is determined by considering
whether securities, insurance, real estate activities and
ownership of non-financial firms are unrestricted (¼1),
permitted (¼2), restricted (¼3) or prohibited (¼4). We
construct an overall index by calculating the average value of
all four activities.
DIB is a dummy variable for an Islamic bank. DIB is equal to
one for Islamic bank and 0 for the conventional bank. By
introducing the Islamic bank dummy in the model, it allows a
comparative analysis that addresses the question of whether
there is a significant difference between the risk-competition
relationship of Islamic banks and conventional banks.
Further, to examine whether there is the differential impact of
each bank internal factors on the risk-taking of Islamic banks
and conventional banks, the study introduces additional
specification variable by including the interaction between
Islamic bank dummy with each bank-specific variables. The
DIB*Bit is the interaction term between an Islamic bank
dummy with each bank-specific variables that take the value of
one for Islamic bank and 0 if otherwise. The interaction term
gauge the difference between conventional and Islamic banks
for the respective bank internal factors. By introducing the
interaction term, the slope coefficients between the two
banking systems can be differentiated (Gujarati & Porter,
2009). For instance, the effect of bank specific factors on
risk taking in Islamic banks is measured as b2 þ b6; while for
conventional banks, the effect is measured as b2. a is a bank-
specific intercept, f is fixed effects controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity across countries and years ε is the error term and
I and t refer to bank and time respectively.
LLRit ¼ ai þ b1MPit þ b2Bit þ b3Mjt þ b4
REGit þ b5DIB þ b6DIB * Bit þ fit þ εit (4)
NPLit ¼ ai þ b1MPit þ b2Bit þ b3Mjt þ b4REGit þ b5
DIB þ b6DIB * Bit þ fit þ εit (5)
As shown in Table 1, the comparison of total numbers of
both Islamic and conventional banks tells that Islamic banks
S38 N. Alam et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 19-S1 (2019) S34eS43dominate the banking systems in countries like Bahrain and
Malaysia. The banking systems of other countries, however,
can be seen as a developing one.
The significance of the Islamic banking in the banking
sector can be shown in Table 2 which represent the allocation
of total assets of both banking concepts. The table shows there
is a significant increase in the size of the Islamic banking
industry between 2006 and 2016. Conventional banking in-
dustry, however, has been decreased in size over the period,
from 90.21 percent in 2006 to 84.48 percent in 2016. The
growth rate of total assets of Islamic banking has increased
significantly from 9.79 percent in 2006 to 15.52 percent in
2016.
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics of banks by
country. It is noted that in terms of total assets, conventional
banks express an overall total asset of USD 13635.943 million,
while Islamic banks, in general, show total assets of USD
5483.304 million. Islamic banks in KSA have the largest size
in total assets (USD 20574.24 million), followed by Kuwait
(USD 17375 million) and Qatar (USD 9399.81 million). On
the other hand, conventional banks in KSA also has the largest
share of total assets (USD 33439.4 million), followed by
Malaysia (USD 28393.45 million) and UAE (USD 22956.1
million).
In terms of profitability ROAA, conventional banks made
larger profits than Islamic banks in total (1.508 against 0.736)
which show a contrasting result found by Olson and Zoubi
(2008). Islamic banks in Qatar have a higher profitability
(3.938), whereas Islamic banks in KSA, Kuwait and Turkey
have a similar economic efficiency to conventional banks.
Conventional banks are more profitable than Islamic banks
might due to the reasons that conventional banks have higher
net financing and better asset quality. Islamic banks express
equity to total assets (ETA) significantly higher than conven-
tional banks (16.398 against 14.948 for conventional banks).
This is in line with the various conducts practised by both
types of banks where Islamic banks engage more in equity
dealings. Also, in terms of cost to income ratio, Islamic banks
show a higher cost to income ratio than conventional banks
(53.028 versus 49.706 for conventional banks), indicating Is-
lamic banks are less efficient in controlling cost and increasing
profits compared to conventional banks. However, the study
conducted by El-Gamal & Inanoglu (2005) proves otherwise,
where the authors discovered insignificant difference in effi-
ciency between the two types of banks. In terms of net loans to
total assets, conventional banks have a higher ratio for net
loans to total assets than Islamic banks in total (56.496 against
49.401 for Islamic banks).Table 2
Distribution of total assets between conventional and Islamic banks.
2006 2009 20
Million (USD) % Million (USD) % Mi
Conventional banks 1,197,910 90.21 1,855,779 86.25 2,3
Islamic banks 130,061 9.79 295,866 13.75 38
Total 1,327,972 2,151,646 2,7
Source: Bankscope database and author's own calculations.Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of loan-loss
reserve over the gross loan for the sample countries. The
statistics show that average loan-loss reserve over the gross
loan for overall Islamic banks is comparatively smaller than
conventional banks, except two countries - Bangladesh and
Malaysia. One possible explanation for why the average ratios
of loan-loss reserve for Islamic banks are smaller than con-
ventional banks in overall could be Islamic banks in world-
wide are smaller in size compared to conventional banks
(Chong & Liu, 2009; Alam 2012, 2014). The average loan-loss
reserve over gross loan ratio of Islamic banks for Bangladesh
is 0.082 compared to 0.037 for conventional banks and for
Malaysia; the average ratio of Islamic banks is 0.031 against
0.029 for conventional banks.
The cost function in Equation (1) is calculated for each
bank in each year in order to allow the coefficients of the
translog cost function to change over time. Table 5 presents
the evolution of both HHI and Lerner index between 2006 and
2016 for both Islamic and conventional banks.
As illustrated in Table 5, the Lerner index for Islamic banks
did not show a clear-cut trend over the period. During the
period 2006e2008, the Lerner index for Islamic banks
decreased from 0.32255 to 0.12992, indicating an increase in
competition. The result makes sense since the competition for
conventional banks decreased during this period because of
the financial crisis and Islamic banks were preferred as an
alternative financial service at that time. Islamic banks did not
suffer major losses during financial crisis mainly due to their
financing methods in which interest and all forms of specu-
lation are prohibited and thus, boosting the competition for
Islamic banks during this period (Perry & Rehman 2011).
During the period 2006e2008, the Lerner index for conven-
tional banks increased, indicating a minor reduction in
competition in the conventional banking industry. This
occurrence was followed by a reduction in the Lerner index
during 2009e2010, indicating an increase in competition.
During 2011e2016, the value of the Lerner index for con-
ventional banks increased again showing a decline in
competitive conditions. HHI score for both conventional and
Islamic banks show that HHI in the Islamic banking is five
times higher than the conventional banks.
Table 6, panel A present effect of competition on LLR of
both Islamic and conventional banks. The results indicate that
a large variation in risk-taking the behaviour of banks can be
explained by market power and bank-specific factors namely;
size, bank capitalization and profitability. All these factors
account for 82.3% of the variability in the riskiness. The re-
sults show a positive relationship between the Lerner index11 2013 2016
llion (USD) % Million (USD) % Million (USD) %
56,262 85.90 2,784,361 85.04 3,245,259 84.48
6,738 14.10 489,765 14.96 578,676 15.52
42,999 3,274,126 3,823,935
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of individual variables of banks by country.
Islamic banks Conventional banks
TA ETA ROAA CI NLTA TA ETA ROAA CI NLTA
Bahrain Mean 1532.929 30.000 0.573 63.131 28.618 11195.293 12.656 0.807 45.487 44.002
Std. dev 1228.343 25.407 7.381 94.652 24.500 11030.713 5.397 1.411 19.712 14.940
Bangladesh Mean 713.756 12.136 2.126 55.385 73.423 1759.323 7.563 1.131 48.318 65.004
Std. dev 577.037 30.702 6.375 39.291 7.543 1678.796 3.937 1.904 35.352 10.604
Indonesia Mean 3998.317 6.260 0.886 56.312 63.646 6346.023 24.152 1.085 56.969 55.605
Std. dev 9593.824 2.673 0.569 24.236 25.557 12274.020 170.398 4.664 27.731 19.512
KSA Mean 20574.238 26.006 2.090 46.203 54.442 33439.393 13.313 2.273 35.624 57.162
Std. dev 24168.306 24.918 1.777 28.688 26.046 20292.632 2.950 1.636 11.181 6.946
Kuwait Mean 17375.027 14.952 0.945 49.897 58.859 18699.792 12.206 1.424 29.788 60.691
Std. dev 19331.536 2.681 1.846 13.019 8.520 14081.600 3.053 1.655 7.197 7.009
Malaysia Mean 3725.584 11.099 0.169 43.877 47.829 28393.452 7.530 1.105 42.520 56.848
Std. dev 3574.046 16.455 2.757 25.232 22.055 25127.364 1.969 0.488 10.084 12.738
Pakistan Mean 725.488 21.025 0.746 105.007 40.781 4400.811 9.947 0.652 69.908 46.640
Std. dev 733.780 21.806 2.735 77.772 12.968 3780.212 6.654 1.994 59.423 10.430
Qatar Mean 9399.808 25.522 3.938 21.303 56.725 17830.320 17.296 2.127 32.597 51.673
Std. dev 6061.767 16.796 1.859 7.568 14.526 25605.468 13.963 0.981 17.264 19.635
Turkey Mean 6953.892 11.433 2.099 46.302 66.399 22365.469 18.954 2.948 55.814 54.422
Std. dev 3474.056 3.006 0.900 9.482 17.001 30228.716 19.169 4.886 24.845 20.593
UAE Mean 7376.446 15.256 1.310 43.524 55.349 22956.070 15.238 2.294 34.579 65.660
Std. dev 8341.061 14.557 4.394 49.190 26.884 24818.632 4.692 1.255 11.548 12.347
Total Mean 5483.304 16.398 0.736 53.028 49.401 13635.943 14.948 1.508 49.706 56.496
Std. dev 9647.801 21.214 4.423 56.234 24.86 20825.459 81.942 3.208 32.077 16.48
Table 4
Loan-loss reserve over gross loan of banks by country.
Average loan-loss reserve over gross loan by
country
Islamic banks Conventional banks
Bahrain 0.055 0.074
Bangladesh 0.082 0.037
Indonesia 0.021 0.022
KSA 0.022 0.029
Kuwait 0.047 0.053
Malaysia 0.031 0.029
Pakistan 0.031 0.087
Qatar 0.015 0.016
Turkey 0.022 0.069
UAE 0.030 0.036
Source: Bankscope database and author's own calculations.
Table 5
Year wise Market Power of Banks (HHI and Learner Index).
HHI Deposit HHI Loans Lerner Index
IB CB IB CB IB CB
2006 0.2244 0.0378 0.2264 0.0374 0.3225 0.3116
2007 0.1039 0.0367 0.1089 0.0378 0.0847 0.3688
2008 0.0937 0.0314 0.0875 0.0320 0.1299 0.4944
2009 0.0825 0.0276 0.0845 0.0276 0.2930 0.4058
2010 0.1015 0.0260 0.1075 0.0268 0.1457 0.2068
2011 0.1125 0.0231 0.1201 0.0248 0.1125 0.2289
2012 0.1278 0.0254 0.1447 0.0279 0.0301 0.2138
2013 0.1345 0.0348 0.1505 0.0379 0.2446 0.2383
2014 0.1512 0.0414 0.1632 0.0402 0.2652 0.2528
2015 0.1627 0.0479 0.1674 0.0425 0.2521 0.2751
2016 0.1685 0.0519 0.1681 0.0465 0.2413 0.2862
Source: Bankscope database and author's own calculations. IB ¼ Islamic
banks; CB ¼ Conventional banks.
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fragility” view (Hellmann et al., 2000; Repullo, 2004;
Forssback & Shehzad 2011) which implies that highly
competitive environment induces banks to take on the riskier
loan portfolio. In order to derive a high return and maintain
their high market power banks tends to take on riskier projects.
For country-specific variables (regression 2), it can be seen
that the DGDP has a negative effect on banks' risk-taking
behaviour but found to be insignificant. CPI however, is
positively associated to the overall banking sector risks. This
finding indicates that the banking system will engage in more
risks if there is an increase in the price level of consumer
goods and services in the economy which can be due to the
tight monetary situation in the country. Using the specification
in regression 2 as the basic model, dummy for Islamic banks is
added in regression 3. While controlling for bank-specific
factors and macro factors, the coefficient of Islamic bank
dummy measures whether there is any significant difference
between risk-taking the behaviour of Islamic banks and con-
ventional banks. The finding indicates that there is an evidence
of the difference between riskiness in Islamic and conven-
tional banks. The relationship between Lerner index as a
measure of bank competition and bank risk-taking is negative
for Islamic banks (regression 4). This can be due to the fact
that Islamic banks play safe when it comes to the highly
competitive environment. As suggested by “competition-sta-
bility view” by (Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Boyd et al., 2009).
Islamic banks do not have many avenues to diversify their risk
as they don't have access to the interbank markets and cannot
obtain wholesale funding by paying interest rates, they tend to
use their cash flows to build large buffers which reduces their
risk-taking activity. In the case of TA, there is a positive and
Table 6
Competition and Bank Risk-taking. Competition and bank risk-taking.
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 59 Islamic banks and 149 conventional
banks in 10 markets during the years 2006e2015 (1664 observations). In Panel
A, the dependent variable is Loan Loss Reserve (LLR), and the regressions are
run using bank fixed effects with time dummies. In Panel B, the dependent is
Non-Performing Loans (NPL). Competition measures include the Lerner
index. A larger value for Lerner index indicates a higher degree of market
power. The equations are regressed by the fixed effect estimator using the
Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression model. The LSDV is a
pooled OLS with additional parameters for the country or/and year dummy
variables (constant), and thus identical to the fixed effect estimator. The study
uses LSDV with country and time fixed effect to absorb the unobserved het-
erogeneity across countries and years. There are basically five regression
models. Regression (1) includes only bank-specific variables and regression
(2) includes both bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. The base model
is expanded by including additionally: (3) dummy Islamic bank; (4) interactive
dummy Islamic bank*bank-specific factor; and (5) level of bank regulation.
1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Dependent is LLR
Market Power (MP) 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.268*** 0.203*** 0.162***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TA 0.025** 0.025** 0.024** 0.008 0.004
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.67) (0.33)
ETA 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.014
(0.24) (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25)
ROAA 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.027 0.029
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
NLTA 0.028* 0.028* 0.028* 0.029 0.007
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
CI 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.028*
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.25) (0.08)
CPI 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.002*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
DGDP 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.36) (0.24) (0.30) (0.55)
Dummy Islamic bank 0.014** 0.345* 0.452**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
IB*MP 0.141*** 0.230***
(0.00) (0.00)
IB*TA 0.006** 0.007**
(0.04) (0.03)
IB*ETA 0.003** 0.001*
(0.02) (0.06)
IB*ROAA 0.008 0.065
(0.35) (0.19)
IB*NLTA 0.019* 0.019*
(0.07) (0.07)
IB*CI 0.006* 0.008*
(0.06) (0.08)
SPOWER 0.032**
(0.04)
CAPRQ 0.011
(0.25)
PRIMON 0.012
(0.40)
ACTR 0.025*
(0.07)
Constant 1.243*** 2.169*** 2.154*** 1.948*** 1.862***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.823 0.826 0.826 0.842 0.841
Observations 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164
Panel B: Dependent is NPL
Market Power (MP) 0.326*** 0.326*** 0.302** 0.254** 0.201***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00)
Table 6 (continued )
1 2 3 4 5
TA 0.016** 0.015** 0.018** 0.012 0.008
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.50) (0.30)
ETA 0.045 0.028 0.020* 0.015 0.017
(0.15) (0.17) (0.08) (0.20) (0.20)
ROAA 0.018** 0.020** 0.048* 0.027 0.029
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14)
NLTA 0.015* 0.012* 0.021* 0.024 0.021
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15)
CI 0.026** 0.026** 0.025 0.03 0.017*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.08)
CPI 0.015 0.021 0.027 0.023
(0.50) (0.48) (0.16) (0.21)
DGDP 0.025** 0.015* 0.027* 0.012*
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Dummy Islamic bank 0.027** 0.28** 0.32**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
IB*MP 0.251*** 0.260***
(0.00) (0.00)
IB*TA 0.028** 0.014**
(0.03) (0.03)
IB*ETA 0.022** 0.005*
(0.02) (0.07)
IB*ROAA 0.005 0.025
(0.24) (0.15)
IB*NLTA 0.045 0.021
(0.14) (0.13)
IB*CI 0.014* 0.018*
(0.06) (0.06)
SPOWER 0.043**
(0.01)
CAPRQ 0.127
(0.17)
PRIMON 0.031
(0.12)
ACTR 0.011**
(0.04)
Constant 1.482*** 2.252*** 2.231*** 1.821*** 1.782***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.852 0.858 0.863 0.865 0.891
Observations 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164
Note: p-values in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significant sign at 1%, 5%
and 10% respectively.
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results show that large banks of both types seem to take on
more risks and have a higher loan-loss reserve since large
banks are harder to control and thus, engage in riskier activ-
ities. This finding is supported by the “too-big-to-fail” view
from (Boyd & Runkle, 1993; Mishkin, 1999) where bigger
banks dare to take on more risks since they will not fail easily.
ETA, however, shows a negative and significant result for Is-
lamic banks, but a positive and insignificant result for con-
ventional banks. Banks with higher equity on hand tends to
have more prudent risk-taking behaviour and thus have a lower
loan-loss reserve as stated by (Berger et al., 2009; Saurina
et al., 2007). This is true for Islamic banks where the banks
hold more equity due to the practice of profit and loss sharing
contracts and high risks can be offset by higher equity capital.
Table 7
Robustness test using two step.
Robustness Check- Two-Step GMM
LLR NPL
Market Power (MP) 0.460*** 0.375**
(.1563) (.1652)
TA 0.102 0.674
(.189) (.523)
ETA 0.486 0.482
(.468) (.465)
ROAA 0.168 1.235
(.101) (.375)
NLTA 0.012 .102
(.118) (.187)
CI 0.287 0.173*
(.528) (.078)
CPI 0.004 0.302
(0.010) (.237)
DGDP 0.146 0.179*
(.139) (.184)
Dummy Islamic bank 0.003** 0.014**
(.001) (0.006)
IB*MP 0.027** 0.018**
(.013) (0.009)
IB*TA 0.104 0.055**
(.041) (.021)
IB*ETA 0.069* 0.177*
(.043) (.112)
IB*ROAA 0.309 0.124
(.2354) (.301)
IB*NLTA 0.212* 0.170
(.116) (.103)
IB*CI 0.521* 0.805*
(.187) (0.327)
SPOWER
CAPRQ
PRIMON
ACTR
Constant 2.891*** 3.001***
(0.598) (0.158)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
AR (1) P-value 0.008 0.031
AR (2) P-value 0.537 0.402
Hansen J- P-value 0.827 0.729
The ***, **, and * represent p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. Robust standard
errors are reported in the parentheses.
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has a positive association with risk-taking. These results are
supported by studies conducted by Allen & Gale (2000) and
Levine (2003). With respect to CAPRQ and PRIMON, the
results are positive and statistically insignificant. The insig-
nificant results for both CAPRQ and PRIMON are not in line
with the findings by Repullo (2004) and Konishi and Yasuda
(2004) which suggested that capital requirements and private
monitoring take on as a hugely significant role in banks' risk-
taking behaviour. In the case of last regulatory variable, ACTR
shows a negative and significant relationship between loan-
loss reserves for banks which imply that if restrictions are
imposed by regulators on bank activities; banks will tend to
undertake less risky undertakings since higher activity re-
strictions result in lower loan-loss reserve which is in line with
the findings of Claessens and Laeven (2004).
Table 6, panel B shows our results using nonperforming
loans to total loans as our proxy for loan portfolio risk. The
results in the panel B validates the findings of the panel A and
also increases the explanatory power of the model which can
be seen from increased adjusted R square. The findings imply
a positive relationship between proxy of market power and
NPLs. This suggests that more market power is associated
with significantly higher overall risk-taking behaviour. The
results lend support to the “competition fragility” view that an
increase in competition in banking is likely to erode the
franchise value of firms and encourage banks to increase their
overall risk exposure. With respect to ROAA, it is observed
that a negative and significant result which indicate that higher
margin and profits earned by banks can lower the non-
performing loans of banks, ultimately, reducing banks' risk-
taking behaviours (Olson & Zoubi, 2008). Panel B shows
that CI has a statistically significant and negative impact on
both Islamic and conventional banks. This is in contrast with
the results estimated in Panel A. For country-specific vari-
ables, it can be seen that the DGDP has a statically significant
negative impact highlighting that banks take on more risks
when the growth rate of GDP per capita within an economy
slows down.
Regulatory variables show similar relationships as found in
panel A, thus validating the outcome and the relationships
proposed earlier. All regressions present consistent results for
almost all variables indicating that our specifications models
are robust. Findings validated structural differences in the risk-
taking the behaviour of conventional and Islamic banks under
different competitive environment. While conventional banks
are found to be the supporter of “competition-fragility view”,
Islamic banks tend to incline more towards “competition-sta-
bility view”.
According to Arellano and Bond (1991), fixed effects
LSDV might be inefficient, which necessitates the exploitation
of orthogonality conditions that exist between the lagged
values of the dependent variable and the disturbance term
through the use of an additional instrument in the model. Thus
to overcome the endogeneity issue, we conducted a robustness
check of our findings by using a two-step system GMM
method. The results are reported in Table 7. The results are toa great degree consistent with the earlier findings. All bank-
specific variables have the same signs as in the previous re-
sults. There are, however, slight differences in the statistical
significance of these variables.
4. Conclusion and implications
Our results regarding the risk-competition relationship
suggest that bank competition have a negative association for
Islamic banks risk-taking behaviour in contrast with the pos-
itive association for conventional banks. Under the traditional
“competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes
market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced
franchise value. This encourages banks to take on more risk to
increase returns. The findings also confirm the reasoning that
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segments where the degree of competition is low in order to
achieve higher rates of return.
The study found that Islamic banks have lower market
power compared to conventional banks as supported by Weill
(2011) and different from the findings by (Kuran, 2004; Sahut
et al., 2011). It is also clear that both Islamic and conventional
banks with larger size tend to take on more risks since the total
assets have a significant positive relationship between loan-
loss reserves for both bank types. Islamic banking, however,
with their religious based system allow them to hold more
equity and more profitable than conventional banks and thus,
have a lower loan-loss reserve. Conventional banks, on the
other hand, are more efficient in controlling costs than Islamic
banks and hence, have a lower loan-loss reserve.
This paper has significant implications for policymakers
including central banks and other international agencies
operating in countries where dual-banking systems coexist.
This study will enable researchers and relevant organizations
to understand the market power of each type of banks and how
the varying degrees of market power could impact banks' risk-
taking behaviour of the two types of banks. The findings from
this research will be of high use for government policy for
countries with the highly dual-banking environment in
implementing a policy such as licensing of new Islamic and
conventional banks as the results provide particular implica-
tions that the policymakers could employ for the management
and regulation of the banks.
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